unkleE and kevin debate whether there is compelling evidence for god

[kevin]

tried to make the title

"compelling evidence for the existence of god . . ."

lots of people believe and have always believed in god, gods, or things that are like god or gods. so what is a god? is there a compelling reason to believe in a god? which one? more than one? all of them?

why? why not?

in this continuing series, unkleE and kevin address this question and in the process, decide once and for all the nature of reality, the problem of good and evil, the nature of the man behind the curtain, and the future of everything.

along the way we will trisect the angle with compass and straight edge, demonstrate our working prototype for cold fusion, expose the conspiracy behind the round earth hypothesis, present a recipe for okra that actually makes it worth eating, and finally, solve the ultimate question burning through all of your minds:

how much wood would a woodchuck chuck, really?

[kevin]

i had a witty and intelligent post introducing myself, which vanished under a faulty keystroke like so many things that remind me to be more humble.

i'm a friend, a member of stillwater monthly meeting of the religious society of friends, conservative. i used to be an atheist, then i was an agnostic, then i was a theist, now i am a non-theist, although i use the term agnostic for people who are unfamiliar with the quakers and their different take on vocabulary.

i have no belief in god, because the conditions and continuing evidence that formerly convinced me no longer obtain. should those conditions return, i will reassess my belief and would have no problem becomeing a theist again, hopefully a better one.

[unkleE]

Hi Kevin, nice to be in conversation with you. I reckon I'll leave cold fusion until tomorrow, and get started with "compelling evidence".

I think a good place to start is to discuss for a moment what we think is "evidence" and what makes it "compelling" - in cases other than God, and for God also. Then at least we might be discussing on the same page.

So I think "evidence" is any fact or alleged fact which throws light (positive or negative) on the truth of a proposition. It can be an observation or a deduction (and maybe more). So let's take a simple example. We observe an orange-yellow "ball" moving across the sky each day. That is evidence of something - we may argue that it is evidence that the sun revolves around the earth. But we may do further observations and measurements (e.g. of other objects which more across the sky, like the moon, stars, birds and planes) and those observations may be seen as evidence that the earth revolves a round the sun. In both cases the facts are evidence, though in the first case they turn out to be apparent evidence of something which isn't true, in the second case they turn out to be evidence of something that we now know to be true.

So what makes evidence compelling? I think it is a matter of explanation. As we saw in the above example, evidence must be interpreted, and it is only useful if it provides an explanation of something we want to know. To be compelling evidence, it must explain something well, at the very least better than any other explanation of the facts, and preferably so much better that all other explanations are unlikely. I don't believe many questions outside logic and mathematics can be "proven" so I think the would "proof" isn't helpful. So there was a time in the history of cosmology when there were several hypothesis - e.g. a rather complicated Ptolemaic model and the simpler Copernican model. Both these models explained the observable evidence, but mathematical/physical deduction showed the Copernican model to have a better theoretical basis in Kepler's and Newton's laws of motion, and so it was the best, and right, explanation.

I hope you may agree more or less with this, but we can discuss further .

Applying this to the question of God....

I propose that virtually every significant fact about the universe and the human race can be evidence for or against the existence of God. (I say "significant facts" simply because there are many, many facts, like what I ate for breakfast yesterday, that I don't think are significant to this question.) My belief is that the sum total of those significant facts can be far better explained by the proposition "God exists" that by any other proposition, and my task is to try to demonstrate that here. If I could show that, I would, I believe, have offered compelling evidence for God.

So I hope this isn't too theoretical a start to our discussion, but I think it is worth defining a few concepts so we are on the same playing field (or we know from the start that we're not).

[kevin]

i would say that "evidence" is anything invoked or suggested to shed light on a problem, not one that clearly succeeds, or that is agreed to by all parties. for example, i think the genesis account of creation is evidence for the divine ordination of the universe and the creation of the cosmos and everything in it. it may not be good evidence, to everybody, but it is evidence that is brought forward.

i link evidence with proof. one kind of proof consists of sufficient evidence introduced to make a reasonable judgement of truth, as in induction. a particular combination of several pieces of evidence can make a sure judgement of truth, as in observation or deduction. so i think it's possible to prove a statement if the statement is carefully formulated. for example, if we take your sun and watch it rise 100 times in a row in the east we can induce with reasonable certainty that the sun rises in the east, and i would accept that as proof. but if we see it rise in the west one time, we have proven beyond a doubt that the sun does not always rise in the east. one is a proof of high probability, the other is a proof of certainty. i'm willing to accept both and call them both proof. that's how we all think about reality in this world, and i think to do otherwise for the god question sets an unreasonably high hurdle.

by the way, the heliocentric solar system of copernicus wasn't really less complicated than the ptolemaic version-- he still had all the various epicycles in there to account for retrograde motion, too. but when he drew that cool picture of the planets circling the sun in the frontispiece, he left all the epicycles out to make the presentation neater. the picture horrified everybody so much that they didn't actually ever read the book, and so to this day, we all think that his model simplified things. i looked over a copy of it in a library collection once (before they threw me out for snooping in the priceless book section), and the picture is really deceptively simple.

anyway, i believe that both inductive and deductive reasoning, and observation, can constitute compelling proof. i agree that the key is explanatory ability. if a piece of evidence cannot be used to provide a compelling explanation of reasonable sureness or certainty for a question, then the evidence hasn't proven anything.

i agree that any significant fact in the universe can be used for evidence of god, or at least of one god or another. whether it is compelling evidence providing proof depends on which question it is applied to. and if the nature of the god in question is matched to the evidence which will be used to prove his existence, a priori, then i think you can probably prove that any god exists. but the existence of this god-- proven through reasoning, as an "answer" to a question rather than an experience-- can likely be disproven as easily, just by changing the premises one proposes in the beginning.

because of this, i would likely reject establishing the existence of god based on reason, and skip directly to observation, instead. to experience. this is the quaker solution to the question, as well as that of david:

Psa_34:8  O taste and see that the LORD is good: blessed is the man that trusteth in him.


so i'm willing to start out with reasoning god into existence, but sooner or later i will ask when we get to pull the curtain back and actually see the man pulling the levers. and if we can't, then my next question will be why not, and what that means.

if i can demonstrate that reasoning does not adequately prove the existence of god, or that observation cannot confirm his presence, then i will not have proven god not to exist, but i will have proven his existence unnecessary. that would cause the affirmation of god to fail your test of explanatory ability, because the evidence would no longer compel a reasonable person to that solution.

[unkleE]

Hi Kevin, I am pretty happy with that response. I think I agree with most of what you say, so I think we can move forward with fair agreement on what constitutes evidence. I don't usually use the word "proof" for anything much other than logic and mathematics, but I am happy with your pragmatic approach to it.

So I'm going to start with these statements of yours:

if the nature of the god in question is matched to the evidence which will be used to prove his existence, a priori, then i think you can probably prove that any god exists. but the existence of this god-- proven through reasoning, as an "answer" to a question rather than an experience-- can likely be disproven as easily, just by changing the premises one proposes in the beginning.

because of this, i would likely reject establishing the existence of god based on reason, and skip directly to observation, instead. to experience. this is the quaker solution to the question

so i'm willing to start out with reasoning god into existence, but sooner or later i will ask when we get to pull the curtain back and actually see the man pulling the levers. and if we can't, then my next question will be why not, and what that means.

I start with the observation that there are two types of people - those who divide the world into two types of people, and those who don't! 

Another dichotomy I notice is that there are two basic modes of thinking - analytical and some intuitive, and this is a distinction that psychologists have noted and analysed. Analytical thinking involves careful analysis (yes!), with time taken to reach a conclusion via structured thinking, while intuitive thinking leads to making decisions more quickly on the basis of what "feels" or "seems" right.

It turns out that:

• Most people employ both types of thinking, with intuitive being the most common, because (a)  it would take too long to make decisions if we were analytical about everything, we would waste time on relatively unimportant decisions and we may lose too much if we waste time making a decision that is urgent, so (b) that's what evolution has given us.
• Some people use analytical more than others, and some hardly use it at all.
• Some people would expect that analytical thinking is actually better, even if slower, but studies have shown that if the matter is complex, intuitive thinking may give better results as well as being quicker.
• Some psychologists think that we make all our decisions intuitively, and then rationalise the important ones later using analytical thinking.

Now I say all this to say that I think to some degree, we can see this distinction among theists (and among atheists too for that matter). Some try to come to (dis)belief using analytical thinking = rational argument, or at least they rationalise their (dis)belief, but others choose what "feels right" = intuitive thinking. And I suspect that the distinction you make between reasoning and experience is somewhat akin to the analytic-intuitive dichotomy. It doesn't matter to me if it isn't exactly the same, as I use the comparison only to illustrate my first response to what you have said, namely ....

I think some people, e.g. me, have very little experience of God, at least that they could use to justify faith, while others , e.g. my wife, have a much greater experience that they regard as from God. Now if there's no God, then both those responses are in fact an illusion, but if there is a God, I think both types of people need a way to try to know him.

So I'm going (in following posts) to accept your challenge to argue for God based on evidence and reason, not personal observation, and attempt to show that we can "pull the curtain back and actually see the man pulling the levers".

So I'll get into it in my next post. (Sorry to take a while with preliminaries, but we have plenty of time - I hope!  )

PS Thanks for the interesting info about Copernicus. I guess the simpler heliocentric system, without epicycles, became attributed to him even if that wasn't exactly what he came up with.

[kevin]

we have all the time in tbe world. thete was supposed to be a commentary tbread set up automatically, but i'll do one manually later

hauling sand right now

[kevin]

when i said reasoning versus experience, i was proposing that experience is the more sure test. by experience i mean actual, hard-core encounters with an immanent god. i'm biased.

i know of one quaker who was granted visions in a cornfield, consisting of several lessons. finally he was shown his own death. another quaker i knew was visited by an angel in an apple tree. (he was picking). yet another encountered angels (again) in a meetinghouse in pittsburgh. all these encounters were supernatural, or at least were pereived to be. many people consider them just nuts.

quakerism holds that encounters like these, and also including "leadings," are how god can communicate with human beings. in my own current experience, i find that these sorts of visitations are mostly the sorts of things that quakers would like to have, rather than things they actually do have. but i know some very rational and down-to-earth people who tell me about very strange things that have happened to them in a religious context.

reasoning to me is suspect, because while it is a sure test of a valid relationship (deductive reasoning, anyway), the devil is in the details. in reasoning, the devil is in the premises. garbage in, garbage out, so to speak. anything can be proven if the appropriate premises are assumed to be true, but in a religious argument, there is often not agreement on that.

I think some people, e.g. me, have very little experience of God, at least that they could use to justify faith, while others , e.g. my wife, have a much greater experience that they regard as from God. Now if there's no God, then both those responses are in fact an illusion, but if there is a God, I think both types of people need a way to try to know him.

So I'm going (in following posts) to accept your challenge to argue for God based on evidence and reason, not personal observation, and attempt to show that we can "pull the curtain back and actually see the man pulling the levers".

but let's start ^^^here.

i dunno where i would start. where would you?

[unkleE]

I have a problem with either experience or reasoning/evidence alone, for I think both can be lacking.

Reasoning on its own can be sterile and can even be self serving - leading to whatever conclusion you set things up for by your assumptions, just as you say. But experience alone can be elusive and delusive - we can fool ourselves, and experience can be simply the product of our particular psychology at the time.

So we need both, I think.

So my starting place is evidence and reasoning, to give me an objective basis, then I will try to move onto experience. One question here - do you think experience of God has to be your own current experience to be useful? Can you not trust the experience of those people you mention, or your wife, or yourself in the past?

The way it works for me is, I have a much greater emphasis on reasoning and evidence in the way my brain works, while my wife has a much greater emphasis on experience of the spiritual. But we both add to what the other has. I'm wondering if you couldn't do that?

So my posts here will follow the sort of reasoning that leads me to continue in my faith (albeit the content of my belief changes from time to time), following arguments and evidences that you will be familiar with at first, but moving into others, less philosophical later. And of course who knows how our discussion will alter that intention?

So I'll send this comment off and then get started on step 1.

[unkleE]

Hi Kevin,

Here goes with the evidence that ?compels? me to think God indeed exists. I will be starting with thinking about the universe, and gradually zeroing in and becoming more personal. Initially these will be familiar arguments to you, but hopefully our discussion can still be interesting and helpful.

Evidence 1: Why is there a universe at all?

Our experience teaches us that everything that happens has some cause or reason or explanation. People for millennia have looked at the starry sky and concluded that a god made it all. But does this observation have any value in today?s scientific age?

There are two formal arguments that help analyse this. The first argument goes like this

• Whatever begins to exist (a) has a cause external to itself or (b) arises out of something external to itself.
• The universe began to exist.
• Therefore the universe has a cause or arose out of something external to itself.

Premise 1 seems to apply to every physical event ever observed. Causation is familiar to us (clause (a)). The only apparent exception is quantum physics, where on the most common interpretations, particles can begin to exist without any cause. But particles are ?just? excitations of a quantum field, so they don?t begin out of nothing - they arise out of that field (clause (b)). So I regard premise 1 as very likely.

Premise 2  is much argued over. We can?t count from a finite number to infinity, so clearly we can?t do the reverse and count down from infinity to a finite number. So it is argued that an an infinite series of past events is logically impossible. Or is it?

But the theoretical physicists also argue about this, and one of them, Aron Wall has reviewed all the physical hypotheses that are relevant to whether the universe had a start, and concluded that 5.5 out of 7 point to a beginning (that?s about 80%). So he concludes: ?We don?t know for sure whether the Universe began, but to the extent that our present-day knowledge is an indicator, it probably did.?

So if the first premise is ?very likely? and the second premise is ?probable?, we can surely say that the conclusion is ?more likely than not?.

Of course we haven?t got to God yet, I?ll leave that for another day. But we have got a reasonable conclusion that is suggestive.

What do you think about that argument, as far as it goes?

[kevin]

Reasoning on its own can be sterile and can even be self serving - leading to whatever conclusion you set things up for by your assumptions, just as you say. But experience alone can be elusive and delusive - we can fool ourselves, and experience can be simply the product of our particular psychology at the time.

. . .

So we need both, I think.

briefly, i agree. i emphasize experience, for without experience, there is nothing to reason about, no questions, no need for an answer. but if there is an answer that begins with experience, then if it is not capable of being backed by reason, then i don't think it is valid. this is because i believe in one world, one magisterium.

passed up a chance to have lunch with s. j. gould, once. could have asked him about that.

[kevin]

hey

What do you think about that argument, as far as it goes?

well, look at this:

There are two formal arguments that help analyse this. The first argument goes like this

• Whatever begins to exist (a) has a cause external to itself or (b) arises out of something external to itself.
• The universe began to exist.
• Therefore the universe has a cause or arose out of something external to itself.

Premise 1 seems to apply to every physical event ever observed. Causation is familiar to us (clause (a)). The only apparent exception is quantum physics, where on the most common interpretations, particles can begin to exist without any cause. But particles are ?just? excitations of a quantum field, so they don?t begin out of nothing - they arise out of that field (clause (b)). So I regard premise 1 as very likely.

Premise 2  is much argued over. We can?t count from a finite number to infinity, so clearly we can?t do the reverse and count down from infinity to a finite number. So it is argued that an an infinite series of past events is logically impossible. Or is it?

first, i would argue that the premise 1 is unproven. in fact i dispute it. to say that everything that has been observed has a cause external to itself is to neglect the universe, which may or may not have a cause. in the microcosm, everything that i observe around me certainly does have an external cause-- the weather, my itchy shoulders, black holes, and so on. but to extrapolate the little world to the big world is a stretch, not an observation.

stephen hawking addressed this in a recent book about M theory, which i can't find in all my clutter. here it is (quoted elsewhere):

First, he postulated a ?no boundary? model for space-time in an effort to avoid a cosmic beginning. However, Hawking likely realized that still doesn?t answer the ?why? question of existence, so he turned to espousing the following: ?Because there is a law like gravity the universe can and will create itself from nothing. Spontaneous creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists. It is not necessary to invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.?[4]


without getting into the theory, which i don't understand and don't even have handy, hawking proposes that certain laws are characteristic of th epresent world of physics, chemistry, and biology, and that those laws hang in space like the strings an engineer used to hang in the factory to align the construction of a locomotive. given those current laws, the un-caused self-creation of the universe is inevitable. maybe we should explore this one. it will be lengthy.

i also can't accept premise 2, because i don't have any reason to accept or reject eternity. why shouldn't the universe have always existed? we have a sample size of 1, and from that we have absolutely no idea of the nature of the macro-laws that obtain. to me it's a non-issue. it's like trying to derive general climatological models based on our ocean currents and landforms. we can't really propose an overall theory, because we have so few oceans and so few ladforms that we might as well just stick to observation instead. our sample size is limited to 1. it certainly exists now, but whether it was created or not is a premise that i have yet seen to be established as true.

So if the first premise is ?very likely? and the second premise is ?probable?, we can surely say that the conclusion is ?more likely than not?.

Of course we haven?t got to God yet, I?ll leave that for another day. But we have got a reasonable conclusion that is suggestive.

What do you think about that argument, as far as it goes?

so if premise 1 and premise 2 are true, i don't have a problem with this reasoning, concluding that the universe had an external cause.

but why should i accept either premise? where is the evidence or reasoning that should lead me to accept them?

[kevin]

remember, i told you i would argue the premises.

[unkleE]

Hello (again) Kevin (not again!)   

remember, i told you i would argue the premises.

Of course, that's exactly what you should do. And I will argue back, at least for a short while. 

first, i would argue that the premise 1 is unproven

Yes it is, but my statement was that it is very likely. I think these things can only ever be a matter of probability.

i also can't accept premise 2, because i don't have any reason to accept or reject eternity. why shouldn't the universe have always existed? we have a sample size of 1, and from that we have absolutely no idea of the nature of the macro-laws that obtain

I'll start with premise 2 first, because I think it makes the discussion easier.

I have suggested that we do indeed have reason to reject an infinitely aged universe. Theoretical physicist Aron Wall has reviewed all the hypotheses, all based on our best knowledge of physics - therefore we (or at least the theoretical physicists, not me!) do have a good idea of the laws that obtain, we are just unsure what hypothesis to build on them.  He found that overall they point to the universe "probably" having a beginning, and says: "We don?t know for sure whether the Universe began, but to the extent that our present-day knowledge is an indicator, it probably did.? He does also say "There is always the possibility that new scientific data or methods could radically change our picture of the very, very early universe."

The reference I gave links back to about 10 posts he wrote to explain each of the cases. I don't pretend to understand it all (you with your better background in science may follow it better than I). But his conclusion is clear - there "probably" was a beginning. So I feel we have to accept it unless you have some compelling argument that he is wrong.

Again, I don't claim "proof", but "probability".

i would argue that the premise 1 is unproven. in fact i dispute it. to say that everything that has been observed has a cause external to itself is to neglect the universe, which may or may not have a cause. in the microcosm, everything that i observe around me certainly does have an external cause-- the weather, my itchy shoulders, black holes, and so on. but to extrapolate the little world to the big world is a stretch, not an observation.

Fair enough. But let's see if we can be clear exactly where we disagree.

I said that causation seems to be true of "every physical event ever observed" except perhaps quantum events, and they arise out of something else.  You seem to agree here. The question is whether we can apply that insight to the event we are discussing (the beginning of the universe, if there was one), which of course we haven't observed.

Essentially, you are saying that whatever is true of everything within the universe may not be true of the universe itself. And I agree. The question is, how likely is it that the universe is different to our common experience?

Your objection is known as the fallacy of composition ? just because a statement is true for all members of a set doesn?t mean it is true for the set as a whole. For example, every person in the set of people on earth has one mother, but it is not true that everyone alive (the whole set) has the one mother.

But in the example of mothers, we can see easily why the extrapolation is a fallacy. But in the case of the universe, why should it be a fallacy? I don't see any reason to do so.

hawking proposes that certain laws are characteristic of the present world of physics, chemistry, and biology, and that those laws hang in space like the strings an engineer used to hang in the factory to align the construction of a locomotive. given those current laws, the un-caused self-creation of the universe is inevitable.

I hesitate to go in against the late Stephen Hawking, although I am emboldened because I think many others disagree with him on this. For several reasons.

1. What are these laws that "hang in space"? How do they "exist"? What does that even mean? (I'll bypass the question of what "space" they are hanging in before the universe began, assuming that is a metaphor.) Are these some sort of platonic forms, or abstract concepts, or what? I suspect the concept remains fuzzy because to explicate it would destroy the argument, but that is only a guess.

2. I can accept that the laws of logic are true even if there is no universe, but the scientific laws are not like that. They are true of our universe, but they could conceivably be different. Theoretical physicists play around with those laws in hypotheticals all the time. So can't see how we can separate those laws from the actual universe we are in.

3. And I cannot see how those laws make creation inevitable. Certainly Martin Rees thought differently, when he said (and at one stage Hawking agreed enough to quote this):

"Theorists may some day be able to write down fundamental equations governing physical reality. But physics can never explain what 'breathes fire' into the equations, and actualises them in a real cosmos."

So great scientist as he was, I think Hawking was less of a philosopher, and he has said things here (if you have represented him fairly, which I assume you have) which lack definition.

So my summary. The universe "probably" had a beginning according to the best science we have. Our experience shows that everything in the universe has a cause or arises from something external to itself. If we want to say the universe is different (rather than just say there is doubt) we need some reason, and I don't see anything much being offered, not that is clear to me at any rate. The best we have is some vague idea that laws somehow hang in space waiting for a universe which will inevitably form somehow and actualise those laws. I would say the concept that God created is less fuzzy, more believable and requires less faith than that, but presumably you think differently?

Perhaps I should end with this question. We both agree that the conclusion of this argument isn't certain. But if you had to make a choice and not sit on the fence, would you say it makes the existence of a first cause more believable or less believable?

[kevin]

personally, i think hawking was an idiot. he was one of those people who was so intelligent he eventually couldn't tell the difference between things he knew to be true and things he thought might be true.

thoreau was another of those people who was so smart he lost the ability to think clearly.

ill get to this in more detail in a bit.

spring cleaning!

[kevin]

let's go ahead and grant the two premises for the moment, and see where they go.

the first premise is that everything that exists has a cause, unspecified.

the second is that the universe isn't eternal.

the first premise is opposed by hawking's M theory, where the universe pops into existence with no past and no cause. (why doesn't it pop out?) i'd like to understand it better, but we have plenty of time for that. and we can argue hawking's no-boundary proposal against the second premise later on, because i don't understand that either.

both these objections to the premises are significant, because they make subsequent reasoning irrelevant. but ffor the moment, let's run with your suggestions:

So my summary. The universe "probably" had a beginning according to the best science we have. Our experience shows that everything in the universe has a cause or arises from something external to itself. If we want to say the universe is different (rather than just say there is doubt) we need some reason, and I don't see anything much being offered, not that is clear to me at any rate. The best we have is some vague idea that laws somehow hang in space waiting for a universe which will inevitably form somehow and actualise those laws. I would say the concept that God created is less fuzzy, more believable and requires less faith than that, but presumably you think differently?

Perhaps I should end with this question. We both agree that the conclusion of this argument isn't certain. But if you had to make a choice and not sit on the fence, would you say it makes the existence of a first cause more believable or less believable?

let's propose that what works little works big: that the universe isn't eternal, and something had to cause it.

sitting on a fence is silly, because there is no point in not answering a question that might have a significant answer just because the answer isn't determinate. that's one of my major criticisms of atheist apologetics-- they'll take a question, decide that the answer can't be derived by a formula, and then throw up their hands and say the answer is no. a classic example are the people who try to do statistical tests of the power of prayer.

so what would be your next step? it's a big jump from having a cause to having a god. how would you bridge that?

by the way, i dont think a materialist solution to the beginning of everything is less fuzzy than god. i dont see either possibility as more than hand-waving. in one case, the priests wear cassocks. in the other, they wear lab coats.

[unkleE]

let's go ahead and grant the two premises for the moment, and see where they go.

Yea, I don't see much point in arguing once we have said what we think and responded to objections. I'm happy to keep moving. Overall, I'll want to make about 7 points, of which this is the first. But just a couple of quick comments.....

the first premise is that everything that exists has a cause, unspecified.

No, it is everything that begins to exist. It is like momentum and inertia. If a thing's there, it's there. The explanation is required when something new happens. This is important for the argument.

the first premise is opposed by hawking's M theory, ...... because i don't understand that either.

No I don't understand a lot of this stuff either. That's why I have referenced Aron Wall, who apparently DOES understand this stuff. I think the thing about Hawking is that his ideas are just among a pool. Not every cosmologists accepts some of them. Again that's why I thought Wall's post was helpful, because it summed up seven or more different approaches.

both these objections to the premises are significant, because they make subsequent reasoning irrelevant.

They only make them irrelevant if they are the only options and proven. I don't think they are either. Also it is worth saying that there is another Cosmological argument that isn't as simple, but it doesn't depend on the universe having a start. If we come back to this, I might have a go at it.

but ffor the moment, let's run with your suggestions

Yep, I'll start work on the next point.

[unkleE]

My second argument is also based on the current science about the universe.

As I'm sure you're aware, scientists have discovered that a bunch of cosmological parameters or values in equations had to be within very fine limits for a stable universe to form, let alone complex life to evolve. Change these numbers even a tiny bit and the universe would only last a short time, or would end up like a thin soup, or be made just of hydrogen, or some other unproductive state.

Theoretical physicists understand enough of the laws of physics to model this, and to calculate the probability of this happening if the numbers were random. And the probabilities are extremely (to say the least) low. Roger Penrose (former professor of Mathematics who worked with Stephen Hawking on some aspects of cosmology) famously calculated that the odds of a low entropy universe such as ours (which is necessary for the development of the universe we see and probably for life) forming randomly were 1 in 10^10^123. Smolin calculated the odds of stars forming in a randomly formed universe as 1 in 10^229. Other cosmologists like Susskind and Rees say chance cannot explain the unlikely formation of the universe. Barnes has shown that this is the view of the majority of eminent cosmologists.

If we want to explain how this state of affairs came about, we seem to have three options. Firstly, either it as designed to be this way, or it was not. If it wasn't designed, then either there is a reason (based on the laws of physics) that it was this way, or there is no reason (i.e. it was random). As far as I can see, there are logically no other options. So, designed, laws or random.

So this leads to the obvious argument. The cosmologists say there is no way this happened by chance, the odds are too long. Secondly, they say there is no prospective underlying theory that explains it. So the odds of that option are low. But if it must be one of the three, then it must be designed, whether we like it or not.

Now there is one way to avoid this logic. If, as many cosmologists think, there are literally zillions of universes, all generated in a random way so that the crucial parameters can take any number in the possible range, then if there are enough universes, eventually one of them will take on the values that we see in our universe. But there are difficulties with this scenario:

• It is by no means certain that it is true.
• Even if true, it is unlikely it can ever be scientifically verified.
• There are reasons why the idea arguably doesn't make sense.
• And even if it is true, we then have to explain how a multiverse formed that is so well "designed" that it creates all these universes each with different values so eventually a productive universe like ours formed. And thus we get into the same argument that it is too unlikely to be random, there is no theory that compels it to happen, so again it most likely was designed.

So the scientific facts as we know them seem to point to the probability (again, not certainty) that the universe was "fine-tuned" by design.

So the end of this argument leaves us with this: The first argument suggests there is probably a non-physical cause that started the universe. This argument suggests this was a designer.

Further arguments will develop this understanding of the cause and designer further.

[kevin]

to reiterate, your first argument was this one:

Whatever begins to exist (a) has a cause external to itself or (b) arises out of something external to itself.

The universe began to exist.

Therefore the universe has a cause or arose out of something external to itself.

let's keep that in mind. i'm accepting it as a postulate so we can see where the reasoning goes, but i still don't see the two premises as demonstrated yet. i'm going through the aron stuff now, but if we can't emerge with a rudimentary understanding oif his points, we're left depending on an argument from authority in the matter, without a clear resolution as to whether the authority knows any more than we do. that won't work, for me. we have to at least be able to understand a minimal portion of it, else we're back at faith.

[kevin]

nice cool spring morning here, overcast with a gentle wind from the south, so it will be a warm and muggy day. the amphibians are all hollering down at the creek. still have the peepers in the evening and the toads trilling in the morning. there?s also several ranids, pickerel frogs, i think, but the main armies of tree frogs and the leopard frogs haven?t yet begun. or green frogs. they?re all due. can?t understand why we haven?t had any bullfrogs yet.

anyway, let me summarize the points that you have suggested:

first:

1.   the state of the universe that we observe is colossally unlikely to have begun to exist.

2.   but it did begin to exist, and therefore it was either designed or it wasn?t.

3.   the authorities cannot explain how an undesigned universe can begin to exist.

4.   because they cannot explain it, it must have been designed.

from ^^^this, you conclude ?The first argument suggests there is probably a non-physical cause that started the universe. This argument suggests this was a designer.?

as i see it, the problem with this scenario is one of boundaries in space and time. we are assuming for a moment that the universe is bounded at the beginning by a creation event. according to the no-boundary theory of hawking and hartle . . .

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartle?Hawking_state

. . . the earliest moments of the universe emerged from a state where time was separated from space?time had no existence, but space did.

but while this theory explains a finite creation event, there are major objections to it with respect to a finite universe in space. . .

https://web.uvic.ca/~jtwong/Hartle-Hawking.htm

. . . the objections to a boundary on space appear to be that the universe as we observe it may not be bounded:



given this, we have a boundary of time consistent with your proposal that the universe began to exist at some particular moment. this is crucial to step 1 of your sorite, above. but it isn?t necessary to invoke design in order to accomodate step 1.

mere unlikeliness is no obstacle to the occurrence of an event if there is no limit to the space within which it may occur. for example, the odds of any individual winning the irish hospital sweepstakes were astronomically low?millions of tickets were sold in 130 countries around the world. yet for 56 years, from 1930 to 1986, some real individual beat those incredibly unlikely odds, year after year. even though the odds of anybody in particular winning were near zero, the odds of somebody winning were 1, a certainty.

similarly, if we accept the model that asserts that time had an earliest boundary, the objections to the hawking-hartley theory suggests that we still have not established that space is equally limiting. given an unbounded playing field, the odds that anything?anything at all?occurring somewhere in it are 1, just like the smaller version of the irish sweepstakes.

however, if the nature of an unbounded universe is not that it is infinite, but that it is finite yet without boundaries, then ^^^this argument is b.s. i suspect that that is what is meant-- that if you shoot an infinitely powerful rifle in a straight line, eventually you will turn around and be hit between th eeyes by your bullet approaching from behind you, it having circumnavigated a curved and continuous surface in space and time an returned to its originating position.

what i have done is disputed your first proposal?that what is unlikely is necessarily impossible?and accepted your second, without accepting the limitations:

If, as many cosmologists think, there are literally zillions of universes, all generated in a random way so that the crucial parameters can take any number in the possible range, then if there are enough universes, eventually one of them will take on the values that we see in our universe.

your proposed limitations to the second topic are these, along with my responses:

• It is by no means certain that it is true.
  
  that?s correct. but we?re looking at the moment to see whether or not it is true.
  
  
• Even if true, it is unlikely it can ever be scientifically verified.
  
  that is also true, but whether we can detect a truth or not does not affect  its truth value. i can close my eyes, but the universe doesn?t go away merely because i can?t see it anymore.
  
  
• There are reasons why the idea arguably doesn't make sense.
  
  then we need to hear them, i think.
  
  
• And even if it is true, we then have to explain how a multiverse formed that is so well "designed" that it creates all these universes each with different values so eventually a productive universe like ours formed. And thus we get into the same argument that it is too unlikely to be random, there is no theory that compels it to happen, so again it most likely was designed.
  
  the problem with ^^^this is that you have taken on the difficult task of asserting causality on the basis of mere existence. unlikeliness is no obstacle, as i have shown. not having a model for why it began to exist is not an obstacle either, because the fact that it does indeed exist is a demonstration that there is was something that caused it to exist, and a universe unbounded by space is an adequate proposal for why unlikely creation events are inevitable. and of course, not having a theory is an argument from ignorance?i don?t know why the american toads begin to trill 10 days after the first spring peepers, and a week or two before the leopard frogs, but they do anyway, whether i understand why or not.
  
  

So the scientific facts as we know them seem to point to the probability (again, not certainty) that the universe was "fine-tuned" by design.

^^^this is not yet demonstrated to be probable yet, i think. what it boils down to so far seems to be a statement that we don?t know for sure why the universe exists, and therefore we should accept theory A, which is dubiously supported on the basis of everything else being unlikely.

what is not addressed is why is a design theory more likely than the un-designed theory? given that it has to be one or the other, only the un-designed theory has been stated as unlikely. would these same cosmologists assert that design theory was unlikely too?

if so, how would we judge between them?

if you disprove my suggestion that the universe has no physical limits, then my proposal that any given universe is inevitable is disproven. to do this would require accepting something like the no-boundary theory with respect to time, but rejecting the same theory with respect to space.

[unkleE]

nice cool spring morning here, overcast with a gentle wind from the south, so it will be a warm and muggy day. the amphibians are all hollering down at the creek. still have the peepers in the evening and the toads trilling in the morning. there?s also several ranids, pickerel frogs, i think, but the main armies of tree frogs and the leopard frogs haven?t yet begun. or green frogs. they?re all due. can?t understand why we haven?t had any bullfrogs yet.

A very nice way to start the day.

It's just about midnight here in the suburbs of a big city, with no sound of frogs, birds or animals, and I'm out for the day tomorrow, visiting friends in the country and two country fairs. So I'll be back then to respond to your latest. Enjoy your day, evening, night and frogs!   

[unkleE]

Hi Kevin, I'm back from an enjoyable day out. For the record, I attended Collector Pumpkin Festival and Tallong Apple Day - two events no visitor to Australia should miss!  For the record, Collector is a village of about 300 people (if you count farms near the village) about 2.5 hours from Sydney, while Tallong is even smaller but closer to Sydney. There's some Australiana for today!

Just a couple of comments re my first argument.

let's keep that in mind. i'm accepting it as a postulate so we can see where the reasoning goes

No, I understand that. I'm just going ahead as agreed with the cumulative case as I see it. I'm not suggesting you have agreed.

if we can't emerge with a rudimentary understanding oif his points, we're left depending on an argument from authority in the matter, without a clear resolution as to whether the authority knows any more than we do. that won't work, for me. we have to at least be able to understand a minimal portion of it, else we're back at faith.

This may prove to be a critical point. I don't see this as an argument from authority, at least not in a bad way. When dealing with highly complex science (or any other speciality) I think we are kidding ourselves if we think we can read a small amount of material, understand it and make a judgment on it if we are not well-versed in that discipline. I don't think that is having faith, but being realistic. So I think if a competent theoretical physicist provides clear information, we should grab it with both hands with grateful thanks. Of course we should review it, but I don't think I can do that, and I'm doubtful you can either - review should consist of seeing how much other experts agree with the assessment, or counter it. I have only briefly checked other views, but I feel confident enough of Wall's expertise and objectivity - he is a christian, but he doesn't think that argument I used is very compelling, so he is not trying to support it, but I am only using the argument in a less rigorous probability sense, so I think it is fine for that.

I think if you are unwilling to accept the views of experts unless you can understand them, we may find we come up against this problem several times. I guess we'll see!

[unkleE]

So now to your response to my second argument.

because they cannot explain it, it must have been designed

Slight correction to what I wrote. I don't think "it must have been designed", that was careless wording, I'm sorry. I think it is more probable that it was designed. i.e. if there are three possibilities and one is very unlikely and one is quite unlikely, then the third is more probable than those two.

Now I suppose someone could say that they know it couldn't have been random, and they don't think it could have been designed so therefore it probably was because of an as yet unknown law, and try to flip the argument around. But I see it this way. We are trying to resolve a question which science as we know it cannot resolve directly - i.e. there doesn't seem to be any way to observe or experiment with God directly. So what we are doing is using things we CAN observe, experiment with and/or test to see if any of them point to God. So for that reason, the scientific assessments that it wasn't random and probably wasn't because of a physical law are well-based conclusions, and they can be used to point to the truth of the less measurable conclusion that we are wanting to test, that there was a designer.

as i see it, the problem with this scenario is one of boundaries in space and time. we are assuming for a moment that the universe is bounded at the beginning by a creation event. according to the no-boundary theory of hawking and hartle

I don't think so. The argument I presented says nothing about the creation event (that was the first argument), this argument talks about the structure of the universe and its laws, regardless of how it got here. The argument could equally apply (I think) to an infinitely old universe. So at the moment I can't see how the Hawking-Hartle stuff is relevant - but perhaps that is just ignorance on my part! Can you explain further if you think it is still relevant to an argument that doesn't relate to the beginning?

that?s correct. but we?re looking at the moment to see whether or not it is true.

That isn't our aim in this discussion, I suggest. As I just said, we're trying to use current science to help answer a non-scientific question regarding the existence of God. If current science changes, then we can change with it, maybe even give up this argument. But until then, current science is what we have, and to look to some unproven and unprovable hypothesis is a form of faith, which is inappropriate in science.

that is also true, but whether we can detect a truth or not does not affect its truth value. i can close my eyes, but the universe doesn?t go away merely because i can?t see it anymore.

Maybe, but we are discussing an argument, i.e. how we know something. I can only use to support that argument things we know are true, or probably true.

then we need to hear them, i think.

I won't go into them here because I think the next point is the important one. But you can read some of them in this paper by Barnes, pages 57-62.

the problem with ^^^this is that you have taken on the difficult task of asserting causality on the basis of mere existence. unlikeliness is no obstacle, as i have shown. not having a model for why it began to exist is not an obstacle either, because the fact that it does indeed exist is a demonstration that there is was something that caused it to exist, and a universe unbounded by space is an adequate proposal for why unlikely creation events are inevitable. and of course, not having a theory is an argument from ignorance?i don?t know why the american toads begin to trill 10 days after the first spring peepers, and a week or two before the leopard frogs, but they do anyway, whether i understand why or not.

I don't think this addresses the argument. Again, the fine-tuning argument isn't about creation but about apparent design. Re the multiverse, my argument is this. I have argued on the basis of known science that it is unlikely that the explanation for the universe's "fine-tuning" is random chance or physical laws, so (I have argued) the only other option, design, is thus more probable. I then argue that if the multiverse (which is scientifically very speculative) is invoked to explain the fine-tuning by allowing random chance after all, we can make the same "design, random or law" argument about the multiverse. Now of course the science is less well known, so we can be less certain about the argument, but we can equally be less certain that the multiverse is even a viable explanation. So it remains true that (1) design is the best of the three options if there is no multiverse, (2) the multiverse is not very certain, and (3) if we are going to argue for the multiverse on the basis of the physics of this universe, then we can argue for design on the same basis.

^^^this is not yet demonstrated to be probable yet, i think. what it boils down to so far seems to be a statement that we don?t know for sure why the universe exists, and therefore we should accept theory A, which is dubiously supported on the basis of everything else being unlikely.

what is not addressed is why is a design theory more likely than the un-designed theory? given that it has to be one or the other, only the un-designed theory has been stated as unlikely. would these same cosmologists assert that design theory was unlikely too?

It is simple logic. (1) Design or random or law. (2) Almost certainly not random. (3) Probably not law. (4) Therefore more likely design.

[kevin]

in passing, arguing from authority is not fallacious if the authority knows what he's talking about. if someone says that he has a motorcar that can reach 648 kph, i'd be very skeptical. but if his name were donald campbell, i would treat his claim as athoritative.

i dont think we need to understand cocmological math to believe a cosmologist. but itz a tricky thing. ive had physicists explain to me that we were soon going to build cities on the inner planets. when i asked where the energy to move that much mass would come from, he showed he hadnt tbought about the thermodynamic cost.

[unkleE]

Yes, I think it is tricky. Debaters sometimes shout "argument from authority" as if it is a magic spell that dispels any counter argument, but that often means they say silly things that experts know are silly (e.g. arguments that the village of Nazareth didn't exist in Jesus' day). As human knowledge increases, no-one can comprehend even a small portion of it, and we need authoritative references to build knowledge and arguments. But as you say, we need sensible authorities, and we should only trust them in the area of their expertise. And occasionally someone who SHOULD know better shows that they don't actually know what they ought to know.

[kevin]

sunset, and the first Hyla versicolor of the year!

just heard a turkey, too. kind of late for that, although the ones up by the house call all day. just lying down on the bed i can hear redwinged blackbirds, eastern meadowlarks, robins, crows, woodpeckers, and three or four others i cant identify. the airshaft for the coal mine about two miles away is roaring, so it drowns out the birds that arent right here.

maybe a rana sylvatica. if it keeps up aftrr dark ill know for sure

by the way, th ereason i haven't replied is that im thinking

[kevin]

please excuse me for not repyling to your post yet. i'm too exhausted with funerals, exercise, and insufficient time to adequately put the two ir three last posts together in my head. but leat me point something out which we will talk about later:

We are trying to resolve a question which science as we know it cannot resolve directly - i.e. there doesn't seem to be any way to observe or experiment with God directly. So what we are doing is using things we CAN observe, experiment with and/or test to see if any of them point to God.

i'm going to open the question as to the necessity of god. if we cannot observe him or interact with him (experimentally or otherwise), then establishing that the universe was designed and had a designer is becomes an uninteresting question. not being observable and not interacting is indistinguisgable from absent, and so we would have to conclude that god may have been here once, but is no longer. or at least, his existence is not distinguishable from absence.

this is a thought to keep in mind for the future.

[unkleE]

by the way, the reason i haven't replied is that im thinking

Always a dangerous option!

if we cannot observe him or interact with him (experimentally or otherwise)

One of the benefits of discussion is that it can expose poor or inadequate thinking or expression and challenge wrong ideas. I again have expressed myself poorly and incompletely. I should have been more precise, saying something like this:

"I have said that I am starting with objective evidence as a basis for later subjective evidence. In seeking objective evidence for God, we are trying to resolve a question which science as we know it cannot resolve directly - i.e. there doesn't seem to be any way to scientifically observe or experiment with God directly. So what we are doing is using things we CAN observe, experiment with and/or test to see if any of them point to God."

[kevin]

^^^this will work. living in a city you probably don't know that it just took me ten minutes to get this window submitted. i'm going to step back to your larger question above it now.

[kevin]

let?s focus on the following for the moment.

I don't think this addresses the argument. Again, the fine-tuning argument isn't about creation but about apparent design. Re the multiverse, my argument is this. I have argued on the basis of known science that it is unlikely that the explanation for the universe's "fine-tuning" is random chance or physical laws, so (I have argued) the only other option, design, is thus more probable. I then argue that if the multiverse (which is scientifically very speculative) is invoked to explain the fine-tuning by allowing random chance after all, we can make the same "design, random or law" argument about the multiverse. Now of course the science is less well known, so we can be less certain about the argument, but we can equally be less certain that the multiverse is even a viable explanation. So it remains true that (1) design is the best of the three options if there is no multiverse, (2) the multiverse is not very certain, and (3) if we are going to argue for the multiverse on the basis of the physics of this universe, then we can argue for design on the same basis.

a multiverse hypothesis is really just a way to make the universe infinite without having to deal with the problems of finite borders. i think we can neglect it, because the probability argument has the same difficulties even within an apparently finite system.

correct if i?m wrong here, but i like to over-simplify things so i can understand the structure. the ?fine-tuning? argument states that the combination of existing physical constants and molecular and atomic and subatomic relationships constitute an interdependent network that is extremely unlikely to exist, because all the components have to work together in order to generate the stable system that we live in right now. this includes everything from the existence of black holes and the speed of light to avogadro's number and the charge on a proton. you?ve said that various cosmologists have calculated that the probability of this system arriving by chance is astronomically small. therefore, since the system does exist, and because it must have been designed or not-designed, the likeliest situation is design.

now, the following two visual metaphors for why this isn?t necessarily the case. first, the cosmologist?s unlikeliness argument for the universe is similar to the old situation of finding a turtle on a fence post. not likely to have gotten there by himself, yet he?s there, and one might conclude that someone probably set him up there. perhaps a better analogy is a mixing bowl, or a chinese wok? a hollow object with a smoothly curving surface. turn the bowl round side up and try to place a marble on the surface such that it won?t roll off. it?s almost impossible. put the marble on one side and rolls away immediately. the other side, the same. in fact, there are millions of places you can let go of the marble, and it will roll away from all except the one, single, point-contact on the very top of the dome. eventually, maybe after thousands of tries, you will conquer statistics and get the marble to stay put. but if you don?t get the marble exactly on the top, it won?t stay, and if it?s disturbed in the slightest manner, it?s gone again.

^^^ the single marble on the top is what the cosmologists are saying the universe looks like, and the fact that the marble somehow got there in that exact correct spot is why they say the universe we have is so unlikely.

but suppose the universe is still shaped like a bowl, but it?s sitting the other way, open at the top, instead of closed? if you put a marble on any point on the inside of the bowl, it will roll to the single geometric point contact at the bottom and stay there. no matter what you start out with, the system evolves to stability, rather than devolving to chaos.

in ^^^this model, the many bazillions of possible universes that might have occurred are irrelevant, because any starting point?any universe that began to exist?will head towards the same stable system and remain there, like the marble in the bowl.

all that i have changed from a universe too unlikely to exist to the same universe being inevitable is that i turned the bowl the other way-- a single reversal of a single characteristic.  so what we have is a dispute regarding probability. the fine-tuning argument sees that the vast number of all possible universes on the surface of the bowl are unstable, yet we live in one that isn't. the obvious existence of this stable one is so unlikely, possibly, that it must have been made that way. and yet if i tweak the system just a bit, by turning the bowl upside down, suddenly all possible unlikely universes lead directly to a single stable  endpoint, which is still just as statistically unlikely as it was before, yet like the rome at the end of all roads, is inevitable.


i'd do the other metaphor, but i'm too tired, and it's just another way of looking at the same argument. i'm losing weight for a motorcycle race in two months, so i'm cycling about five or six miles after work and cutting calories down to about 1200 a day. the cycling wouldn;t be an issue, except where i live is pretty challenging on a bicycle:

[unkleE]

Hi Kev, nice photo. Is that your place in the centre?

I think we are almost on the same page re "fine-tuning", but I want to clarify some things using your helpful analogy or metaphor.

since the system does exist, and because it must have been designed or not-designed, the likeliest situation is design.

My argument considers three possibilities. First there is designed or not-designed as you say. But then not designed can be further defined by dividing into two possibilities - random or not random, with not random meaning controlled by some law(s).

You have included all three of these possibilities in your metaphor of the bowl and the marble:

1. Someone put the marble there on top of the upturned bowl - equivalent to the cosmological designer.
2. It got on top of the upturned bowl by chance - equivalent to the universe being fine-tuned by random chance
3. The bowl was right side up and the marble went down to the bottom because of gravity - equivalent to the universe appears fine-tuned because the laws of physics inevitably ended up this way.

I can offer another example. We observe that the shape of the east coast of South America seems to fit together with the west coast of Africa, and ask how this happened. Again there are three possibilities:

1. God liked it that way so he made it that way.
2. It's just a freak chance.
3. It's that way because of plate tectonics - they really did once fit together.

So with the universe, we can rule out chance unless we accept the multiverse (and then have to start the explanation all over again). But like the Africa/South America example, it make sense to look at the possibility that the laws of physics might have made the fine-tuning inevitable. But it turns out that, while a few cosmologists are apparently holding out for this, most apparently think it isn't likely. For example:

Martin Rees (in Just Six Numbers) says there are the four possibilities we have considered (he calls them providence, coincidence, a theory of everything = laws and the multiverse) and says we don't have a theory of everything, we don't know if we ever will and the numbers don't look like that are all related in a theory of everything. So he doesn't find that option compelling, nor providence or coincidence, though he admits that he's rejected providence because it isn't scientific.

Geraint Lewis and Luke Barnes in A Fortunate Universe, after discussing the science for 6 chapters, address the same 4 possibilities. They rule out chance/coincidence quite definitely, but address the other three in some detail. But neither thinks it likely there will turn out to be fundamental laws (i.e. a theory of everything) that define all the numbers that make the universe fine-tuned and any hope of a theory of everything is "just a dream" at this stage - and even if they there were fundamental laws that explain the constants, we could still ask why the laws were as they are and face the same problem. Lewis seems to favour the multiverse, Barnes a designer.

Leonard Susskind in The Cosmic Landscape opts for the multiverse as the only scientific explanation, which he bases on string theory (which Lewis and Barnes in a later book say has been shown not to be adequate for the task). Susskind also says that there is nothing in the multiverse & string theory to "diminish the likelihood that an intelligent agent created the universe", although he doesn't personally believe that.

So I think my argument is well supported by the scientific facts and the conclusions of cosmologists.

It's not chance, it's probably not determined by laws, it could well be the multiverse, but this leads us back to the same options, so designer looks distinctly possible, albeit not a scientific answer.